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Why Does Voting Get So Complicated?
A Review of Theories for Analyzing
Democratic Participation
Jeff Gill and Jason Gainous

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to present a sample from the panoply
of formal theories on voting and elections to Statistical Science readers who
have had limited exposure to such work. These abstract ideas provide a
framework for understanding the context of the empirical articles that follow
in this volume. The primary focus of this theoretical literature is on the use
of mathematical formalism to describe electoral systems and outcomes by
modeling both voting rules and human behavior. As with empirical models,
these constructs are never perfect descriptors of reality, but instead form the
basis for understanding fundamental characteristics of the studied system.
Our focus is on providing a general, but not overly simplified, review of
these theories with practical examples. We end the article with a thought
experiment that applies different vote aggregation schemes to the 2000
presidential election count in Florida, and we find that alternative methods
provide different results.
Key words and phrases: Voting rules, elections, participation, rational
choice, spatial models, cost–benefit models, Florida 2000 election.
This system is the norm from grade school elections
for class president to congressional elections. However,
not only is this merely one of many possible “democratic” procedures, it is also not the only system currently used in political life in the United States and
around the world.
The founding fathers (James Madison in particular; see Federalist 10) worried about the “tyranny of
the majority” and the notion of “mob rule,” and accordingly wrote several deliberately antimajoritarian
schemes into our constitution such as the Senate (two
members per state regardless of size), the electoral college for presidential elections and specific qualifications for participation that are no longer law. Today,
some local municipalities in the United States set up
elections in more complicated ways to assure minority participation on school boards and county commissions. In many other countries parliamentary seats are
allocated to political parties according to vote totals for
that party, regardless of the success of individual candidates. These schemes are indications that there exist
other criteria of importance besides straight majoritar-

1. VOTE AGGREGATION AND GROUP
PREFERENCES

On a very superficial level, voting seems incredibly
simple: count the votes and declare the winner. However, we know from the 2000 presidential election in
the United States that even the counting part is not
always so straightforward. Furthermore, there are actually many means by which votes can be organized
and counted. Yet from a very early age, citizens of
the United States are indoctrinated with the idea that
plurality rule, the single person/proposal that receives
the most votes wins the election, is the only truly fair
and therefore democratic way to organize elections.
Jeff Gill is Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science and Affiliate Professor in the Department of Statistics at University of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida 32611-8545 (e-mail: jgill@stat.ufl.edu). Jason
Gainous is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
32611-7325, specializing in voting, elections and political methodology (e-mail: gainous@polisci.ufl.edu).
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ian decision, including minority participation in government, political stability and general diversity.
The means by which individual votes are translated
into election outcomes is called preference aggregation
or vote aggregation, and importantly the selection of
this method can actually alter these outcomes. Does
that mean that some of these preference aggregation
methods are democratic and others are not? Actually,
what it means is that “preference” is really a more
complicated notion than it first appears. Voters can
be seen to prefer different outcomes when counted
differently. Take the recent 2002 French presidential
election as an example. In France there is a general
election for all presidential candidates and then, unless
a candidate receives more than 50% of the votes
(rare), the two candidates who receive the most votes
face each other in a runoff one week later. In 2002,
if there had not been a runoff, then according to
every single credible opinion poll Chirac and Jospin
would have received the first and second highest
vote totals, respectively. However, many voters already
anticipating a Chirac–Jospin runoff in the second round
declined to vote in the first round and the extreme rightwing Le Pen beat Jospin to face Chirac in the second
round where he lost 82% to 18%, which reflected the
support measured in opinion polling. What happened
was that the 5.5 million votes Le Pen received in the
first round were enough to pass Jospin, but the 5.8
million votes he received in the second round were
nowhere near enough to challenge Chirac. So voters
demonstrated a different “preference” in the second
round than if the rules had been otherwise.
What makes vote aggregation methods and election
laws important is that they do in fact determine who
wins and who loses. Also, the presence of regular elections alone does not determine the existence of democracy. [It turns out that defining a democracy is actually
quite a difficult task. Dahl (1971) tied the definition of
democracy to the possession of the “voting franchise”
by a substantial proportion of citizens, contested elections and civil liberties. Huntington (1991) required
that “decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult
population is eligible to vote.” Unfortunately, it is easy
to name countries which meet these criteria and yet
still somehow violate our general normative sense of
what it means to be democratic. See Zakaria (1997) for
an engaging essay on this problem.] The Soviet Union
ran regular elections, but only one party was allowed to
put candidates on the ballot. The early election history

of the United States was one that excluded a substantial proportion of its citizens. As a number of countries emerge from communist or totalitarian periods,
the decisions they make in establishing democratic institutions, including electoral procedures, will fundamentally determine the type of governance and public
policy they will have.
Having just established the importance of studying
systems of voting and elections, we have to note that
there is a major disconnect in related topical knowledge. Many people who are deeply interested in election procedures around the world do not understand the
underlying mathematical principles that govern vote
aggregation (this is particularly noticeable with journalists). Conversely, many people who have the prerequisite technical background have not had an appropriate reference that directly explains the theoretical
principles. We address this second deficiency here by
reviewing the fundamental mathematical and logical
precepts of voting and elections theory, without omitting important methodological details.
2. UNDERLYING THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
PRINCIPLES

There is a core set of assumptions about individual
behavior that is necessary to describe systems of aggregate voting in symbolic terms. These fall under the
general rubric of rational choice theory (also called
public choice theory), where individuals are assumed
to make orderly choices that reflect their personal preferences and desires (philosophically summarized in
Buchanan, 1983). This overtly mechanical perspective
evokes strong emotions among advocates and critics,
but usually the more vitriolic debates stem from an
overly canonical interpretation of the paradigm on both
sides. Not even the strongest supporters really believe
that people are 100% rational, doing detailed research
and analysis on every material decision before making
a perfectly informed and deliberate decision. In truth,
the factors that detractors of rational choice highlight,
such as sources from psychological, instinctual, whimsical and unaccounted for sociological characteristics,
are certainly a component of human decision making
in the political context.
Underlying the study of mass voting is the philosophy of methodological individualism, which states that
collective social decisions can be modeled by aggregated individual observations (somewhat like the iid
assumption in a statistical model). Furthermore, it is
recognized that in this process of aggregating individual observations, any discoverable systematic effect
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will also be accompanied by a stochastic term because
there is an inherent random element in human behavior. The payoff for this perspective is that even if some
individual actions are not themselves apparently rational, the full system behaves as a collectively rational
entity with an accepted error component derived by deviations from expectations.
2.1 Rationality

Thus far the term rationality has been left a little bit
vague. Specifically, we mean the following commonly
required assumptions, which are standard in the literature:
Utility. Each individual has a relative sense of benefit: some outcomes that might occur have more value
than other events that might occur (preference ordering). Utility is typically measured as money in economic models, but more generally it could be termed
satisfaction. Utility is personal, private, noncomparable across individuals and can be measured only
indirectly by observable indicators which partially
reveal preferences.
Purposefulness. An individual’s actions (choice) are
purposeful: directed toward obtaining some increase
in utility. Refusing to make a choice (such as not
turning out to vote) is also considered a choice.
Certainty. Individuals prefer choice sets where the results of their selection (through the aggregate outcome) are known with greater certainty rather than
less. Substantial uncertainty of outcomes conditional
on the individual’s actions is undesirable: usually
termed “decision-making under risk.” [We need to
add the caveat though that there are circumstances
where a perfectly rational individual prefers uncertainty over certainty. Consider, e.g., a lottery where
the expected value of participating is favorable. The
individual may prefer to participate (i.e., purchase a
ticket) in this uncertain game rather than accept the
absolutely certain result of no gain by abstention, but
this implies more individual flexibility than the situation imposed by a public election.]
Sincerity. Voters are said to vote either sincerely or insincerely (strategically). Sincere voters (the default
in most models) vote/choose according to their true
utility-maximizing preferences in the current election. The opposite of this sincere voting assumption
is strategic voting (Farquharson, 1969), where individuals select short-term non-utility-maximizing alternatives to maximize some greater long-term utility (often seen in games with repeated trials).
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Comparability. Alternatives are comparable by voters
in the sense that for any two choices, a and b, the
voter either prefers a over b, b over a or is indifferent
between a and b. Furthermore, this preference is
transitive: if the voter prefers a over b and b
over another alternative c, then the voter prefers a
over c, or if the voter is indifferent between a and b
and between b and c, then the voter is indifferent
between a and c.
Buchanan (1983) and others summarize these assumptions in the form of an assumed rational, selfmotivated individual voluntarily entering into economic exchanges (also defined to include political scenarios) and seeking through these exchanges to increase his or her individual utility: so-called species
homo economicus. We generally rely on these assumptions in the descriptions of voting systems and voting
behavior that follow, but deliberately avoid the controversy about broadly assigning universal individual rationality. As with any theory, social science or otherwise, the true test of these theories lies in their empirical verifiability (“instrumentalism”). This debate
about the rationality of self-interest in political behavior can be traced as far back as works by Machiavelli,
Hobbes and Hume, but for current discussions, see Fiorina (1995), Green and Shapiro (1994) and the essays
in Friedman (1996).
2.2 Districting Systems

The results of voting systems are contingent on the
nature of the underlying districting system. A districting system maps electoral regions to legislative representation: how such districts are represented in government. In elections for members of legislatures, the outcome can be contingent on whether there are singlemember voting districts (one representative only per
district), multimember districts (more than one representative per district) or proportional representation
(general party representation).
In the United States, congressional representation
is a mixture: House of Representatives districts are
served by one member from each district, but each Senate district is served by two senators (a variation on
multimember districts because the two Senate seats in
each state are not simultaneously contested). Actually
the United States has institutionalized malapportionment since the “one-person, one-vote” norm is not held
through the Senate, and noninstitutionalized malapportionment since it is impossible to configure exactly
equal House districts across states. Every 10 years a
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complicated and high-stakes game occurs when House
districts are redrawn by the states to reflect changes
from the census (when this redistricting process is done
to advantage a particular racial group or political party,
it is referred to as gerrymandering). Conversely, in proportional representation systems, the focus is on the
parties with the often intended effect of ensuring broad
representation across widely disparate groups in society. Here candidates are simply advocates of their
party, and the legislature is divided roughly in proportion to the total electoral fortune of the parties (typically with a minimum threshold).
Duverger (1963) contended that single-member district systems favor a two-party system; in other words,
the likely outcome of these type systems is a legislative
body that is dominated by two narrowly separated parties on policy issues. Riker (1986) qualitatively tested
the obvious counterpart to this theory, that proportional
representation systems encourage multiparty systems.
His findings indicated mixed support for this proposition: single-member voting districts tend to conform to
Duverger’s principle, but not uniformly.
On the other hand, a consistent criticism of proportional representation (PR) is that it fosters fragmented
legislative politics since voters may find satisfaction
in minority representation by a political party defined
along narrow policy interests. The aggregation of these
narrow interests may result in legislatures split among
many groups with little or no incentive to cooperate
and form coalitions. This is a problem because in PR
systems a majority vote in the legislature is required to
“form a government,” meaning fill the executive branch
positions (ministers). Italy is often held up as a classic example since PR has contributed there to a change
of government roughly every year since World War II.
There are many variations of proportional representation (see Farrell, 2001, for a list), but the general effect
is to empower smaller, more particularistic groups at
the expense of larger, more broadly-based parties.
3. INSTITUTIONAL VOTING SYSTEMS

As the previously discussed French case illustrates,
the structure of the electoral system plays a significant
role in the election outcome. Early work (Rae, 1971;
Fishburn, 1971; Straffin, 1980; Fishburn and Brams,
1981; Riker, 1982; Nurmi, 1983) noticed that multicandidate elections (a term indicating more than two
candidates) were particularly affected by the form of
electoral rules. In this section we describe the primary
forms of electoral systems in use around the world and

characterize how they affect outcomes. These systems
differ in some important ways: some allow voters to
reveal the intensity of their preferences, some are designed to elect multiple candidates and one can even
fail to produce a winner under certain circumstances.
3.1 Unanimity Rule

Unanimity as an advocated procedure is generally attributed to Wicksell (1896), who saw the combination
of unanimous consent combined with line-item taxation as the best way to mandate public policy expenditures in English society. Consider first an n-person
population where each individual has an identified income, Ii , which is fully spent each year on either private goods, Pr, or public goods, Pu. Naturally then
each person has a utility function that defines his or her
two-dimensional spending preferences, Ui (Pri , Pui ),
depending on the utility received in the two dimensions. While choice of spending on private goods can
be determined independently for each individual, the
provision of public goods is through a regularly paid
tax requiring agreement among citizens. Thus each
voter will have his or her own individually preferred
budget line which is a function of his or her utility for
public goods and his or her income, as well as his or
her tolerance for taxes as a way to pay for the public
goods.
The real problem with the unanimity rule is now
quite obvious: you have to get everyone to agree, and
each voter will have a different preference structure.
Suppose that the mandated level of public spending Pu
induces different utilities across the n individuals. That
is, one person almost certainly receives higher utility at
this public spending and associated taxation level than
the others. Such disagreement then needs to be worked
out politically such that the combined utility (public
and private) is sufficient for all voters to approve. This
may not be difficult with a small number of voters,
but the possibility of this cooperative outcome drops
sharply as the number of voters increases, all but
ensuring no unanimous agreement for a reasonably
sized electorate.
3.2 Majorities and Pluralities

The simple majority rule system requires little description here because its definition is essentially contained within its name: the candidate, with votes xj ,
who carries at least one more vote than 50% of the electorate wins the election. The simple majority rule can
present problems in multicandidate elections, however,

WHY DOES VOTING GET SO COMPLICATED?

because it is possible that no candidate exceeds the required threshold (xj > 50%). In these cases, some systems are set up to require a runoff: a new election between the top two vote-getting candidates, the simple
majority rule with runoff system. It is then inevitable in
the second stage that one of the candidates will exceed
the 50% threshold (x1 > 50% or x2 > 50%) because of
the restriction to two participating candidates (except
of course for small elections with an even number of
voters).
Returning to the French presidential election of
2002, consider a voter who strongly supports Chirac
but may vote for Le Pen in the first round. Why would
this person be inclined to vote for a candidate so
far from his or her ideal candidate’s policy position?
Consider that Jospin was expected to challenge Chirac
to a much greater extent in the runoff than Le Pen
and that as incumbent president with a well-established
base of support, Chirac was virtually assured of making
it to the second round. Then this hypothetical strategic
voter may vote for Le Pen in the first round in the
hopes of seeing the weaker candidate face Chirac
in the second: classic strategic voting. This example
highlights a constant danger with such strategic voting.
Suppose Le Pen had somehow beaten Chirac in the
second round. Then the hypothetical strategic voter
would have to accept a president far less palatable than
Jospin.
The plurality system is identical to simple majority
rule except that the winner is merely selected by
attaining the most votes without the necessity of
passing the 50% threshold and, therefore, there is no
need for a runoff (majority voting is a special case of
plurality voting). This is often referred to as first past
the post since in the consecutive counting of votes,
as soon as one of the candidates meets this criterion
then all of the subsequent votes are immaterial to the
electoral decision. While this system is much easier to
implement because there is no longer the necessity to
resolve nonmajority outcomes, it is often considered
bad for the resulting government because the winner
can take office having only minority support. Also,
plurality voting does not take into account the intensity
of people’s feelings about candidates. For instance,
Jesse “The Body” Ventura won the governorship of
Minnesota as a third party candidate in 1998 with
only 37% of the vote. It appears from academic and
journalistic accounts that the 63% who did not vote
for Ventura had more intense negative feelings than the
intensity of the positive feelings of the 37% who did
vote for him. However, the 63% group had their votes
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split across the Democratic and Republican candidates
in such a way that neither party candidate surpassed
37%. Interestingly, it is probable that Ventura would
have lost in a hypothetical runoff vote against the
second highest vote-getter from the first round.
A related vote counting methodology is the antiplurality (blackball) system. In this procedure, voters are
asked to vote against one candidate on the ballot, and
the candidate with the fewest (now necessarily negatively interpreted) votes wins the election (see Saari,
2001, for nuances). This method produces the “least
objectionable” candidate across the voting population.
There are also some slight variations on this scheme,
including multiple rounds of voting, but the general
result is typically to promote candidates who are not
necessarily the best for office or the most dynamic, but
instead those who offend the fewest voters.
The plurality system has some interesting and unexpected consequences. Cox (1997) developed a formal
model that demonstrates for single-member voting districts under a plurality system there will be only two
sustained, enduring parties. Assume that voters have
defined preferences (the election outcome affects their
utility), incomplete information about the preferences
of other voters, expectations about the viability of candidates (partly a function of media coverage, which introduces, not necessarily accurate, aggregate information) and rational voting intentions. The result of these
precepts is that internal conflicts between issue/policy
preferences and viability are most often resolved in
favor of viability: more voters derive greater utility
by voting for the imperfect but acceptable mainstream
candidate over the ideal but long-shot candidate. As
a consequence, nations such as the United States end
up with only two enduring political parties, whose policy positions are well known and very close to each
other in issue space, since politicians and political parties recognize voter acknowledgment of viability.
3.2.1 Plurality voting and efficiency. Economists
have noted that varieties of plurality voting can actually be inefficient. The efficiency standard is measured
in total benefits to the society at large, a deliberately
vague definition but one that can be substituted using
total money or total utility. The inefficiency occurs because the complete distribution of benefits is unlikely
to match up with the way votes occur. For instance,
consider the following five-voter, two-alternative election to determine some public policy decision, with
stipulated benefits shown in Table 1.
It is apparent from the way that the utilities are
set up that policy B provides greater total benefit to
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TABLE 1

Voter

Benefits from
policy A

Benefits from
policy B

1
2
3
4
5

3
3
3
0
0

0
0
2
5
5

Total

9

12

society, but policy A will win because voter 3 slightly
prefers this outcome. Since the less efficient alternative
to society as a whole wins, this is considered an
economically inefficient outcome. Suppose we altered
the vote criteria slightly to include a measurement of
personal utility loss. In each case add up the negative
utility differential from each individual outcome. Thus
policy A provides 0 + 0 + 0 − 5 − 5 = −10 and
policy B provides −3 − 3 − 1 + 0 + 0 = −7. So if some
sense of relative utility were included in the voting,
then outcomes can differ. These sorts of approaches
underlie many of the different voting schemes that we
now discuss.
3.3 Approval Voting

Another process by which elections with more than
two candidates can be organized is approval voting
[generally credited to Robert Weber’s Ph.D. thesis in
1971, but see also Weber (1995)], where voters are
allowed to vote for (approve of) as many candidates
as they want, but cannot cast more than one vote
for each candidate. The candidate with the highest
total number of approval votes in this system is
declared the winner. So voters get K votes to distribute
across K candidates with no more than one assigned
per candidate. This process has been subsequently
described and popularized by Brams (1975) and Brams
and Fishburn (1978, 1983).
A particularly attractive feature of such a system is
that it provides voters with the maximum number of
choices in a single-ballot election. If there are K ≥ 3
candidates, each voter is essentially casting either an
“approve” or a “disapprove” vote for each candidate
depending on his or her distribution of votes. This
seemingly gives the voter 2K possible strategies, but
because an abstention has the same net effect as voting
for every candidate on the ballot, the real number of
different choices is 2K − 1. Approval voting permits
more strategies than simple majority rule and simple

plurality rule due not only to this large number of
strategies, but also because these choice-sets can be
broken down along divisions such as party affiliation,
incumbency status and strategic considerations based
on expected outcomes.
Yilmaz (1999) formalized approval voting in the
following way. Let a, b, c and d be the individual
candidates from which a group of voters can choose
and let aP b represent a given voter’s strict preference for a over b. A multicandidate (strict) preference order is denoted as aP bP cP d. A lack of preference between a and b is indicated by aI b, meaning
that the voter is indifferent or ambivalent between the
two. Given the assumption that strict preference and
indifference have transitive relations, aP b, bP c →
aP c and aI b, bI c → aI c, then, every possible ordering can be separated into  nonempty subsets, where
[a1 , a2 , . . .], [b1 , b2 , . . .], [c1 , c2 , . . .], [d1 , d2 , . . .], . . . ,
[1 , 2 , . . .] are denoted as A, B, C, D, . . . , L. The
voter is indifferent among the candidates within any
single subset while still strictly preferring every member of that subset to any of the other candidate subsets
lower in the preference ordering.
This setup allows us to characterize voting behavior
in the following way: if  = 1, then the voter is
referred to as unconcerned; the voter is referred to
as dichotomous if  = 2, trichotomous if  = 3 and
multichotomous if  ≥ 4. Therefore, for a voter who is
unconcerned, there will be no strict preference between
the candidates in Ai .
If all voters have a dichotomous preference, then an
approval voting system will always produce the selection that is majority preferred, but when all preferences are not dichotomous the process and results become more complicated. In cases such as these there
are multiple admissible voter strategies. An admissible voting strategy is simply a strategy that conforms
to the available options among k alternatives and is not
uniformly dominated (preferred in all aspects by the
voter) by another alternative. For instance, the preference order aP b with bP c has two admissible strategies where the voter may have given an approval vote
for only the top alternative a or for the two top alternatives a and b. Furthermore, with multiple alternatives it
becomes possible for voters to cast insincere strategic
votes: they may truly prefer candidate a, but select candidate b because they believe that candidate c is likely
to receive more approval votes than candidate b and,
therefore, be a greater threat to the preferred candidate.
For any two subsets A and B, define A ∪ B =
{a : a ∈ A or a ∈ B}. The subset that contains only

WHY DOES VOTING GET SO COMPLICATED?

candidate a is denoted {a}, the subset that contains
only candidate b is denoted {b}, the subset that contains
only candidates a and b is denoted {a, b} and so
forth. A strategy is defined as voting for any subset of
candidates approved of or disapproved by the voter and
is denoted by S (voting for each candidate in S implies
strategy S), and the approval voting system as a whole
is denoted by s.
Using the notation and construction of Brams and
Fishburn, allow the following assumptions and definition for the subsequent theorem under approval voting:
• P : If aP b, then {a}P {a, b} and {a, b}P {b}.
• I : If A ∪ B and B ∪ C are not empty and if aI b,
bI c and aI c for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B and c ∈ C, then
(A ∪ B)I (B ∪ C).
• Define M(P ) = A1 , the subset of the most-preferred
candidates under P and define L(P ) = An , the
subset of the least-preferred candidates under P .
T HEOREM 1. If the voter has candidate preferences given with P and I , then strategy S is admissible for system s and preference order only when S is
feasible for s and either C1 or C2 holds:
C1. Every candidate in M(P ) is in S and S cannot
be divided into two nonempty subsets S1 and S2
such that S1 is feasible for S and S2 is lower (less
preferred) for the operation P .
C2. S contains no candidate from L(P ), there is no
nonempty subset A of candidates disjoint from
S and A is higher (more preferred) for the
operation P .
Applying Theorem 1 to approval voting gives the
following results:
• Strategy S is admissible for approval voting and
concerns P only when S contains all candidates in
M(P ) and none in L(P ).
• If a voter has a dichotomous preference order P ,
then he or she has a unique admissible strategy.
This subset of most-preferred candidates is a unique
strategy.
Why is this interesting? Consider a voter who has
the preference order aP bP cP d, while all other voters have dichotomous preferences, some being sequentially indifferent (such as aI b and cI d) and some
strictly prefer a and b to c and d, while the rest prefer
c and d to a and b. Each of the other voters uses his or
her unique admissible strategy, so that the aggregated
preference for a is equal to that of b, f (a) = f (b) and
the aggregated preference for c is equal to that of d,
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f (c) = f (d). Now assume that the voter with preference aP bP cP d believes that there is at least a one vote
difference between a and c, f (a) > f (c) + 1; {a, c}
will probably be the best strategy for this voter because a vote for a ensures that a will receive at least
one more vote than b, and a vote for c ensures that c
will receive at least one more vote than d. Therefore,
{a, c} ensures the election of the aP bP cP d voter’s
most-preferred candidate when f (a) > f (c) + 1 and
the defeat of this voter’s least-preferred candidate when
f (c) > f (a) + 1. Had this voter selected {a, b} and
f (c) > f (a) + 1 held, then candidate d, the voter’s
least-preferred candidate potentially could have won.
The point here is that an approval voting process can
sometimes provide a strong incentive toward strategic
behavior.
3.4 Cumulative Voting

A system that is similar to approval voting is one that
gives each voter multiple votes to distribute across the
candidates, where, unlike approval voting, more than
one vote by each voter can be assigned to individual
candidates. Cumulative voting therefore allows voters
to assign different numbers of votes to reflect their
relative preferences. For example, suppose a voter had
10 votes to distribute across 3 candidates. The truly
committed voter will of course assign all 10 votes to
his or her (strongly) preferred candidate, but a less
ardent voter with ordered preferences may assign them
perhaps as 6/3/1, meaning that the first candidate is
preferred twice as much as the second and six times
more than the third candidate.
The cumulative voting system has been advocated by
Lani Guinier, the Clinton administration nominee for
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. Guinier
(1994) argued that cumulative voting would promote
minority representation better than the current gerrymandering of districts (majority–minority schemes)
because minority voters could pool their votes and elect
the candidate of their choice to one of the seats.
Needless to say, this setup leads to all kinds of
strategic opportunities. For instance, suppose one candidate is particularly distasteful to our hypothetical
voter. It may make sense to place all 10 votes on the
second choice candidate because that candidate has a
greater chance of beating the unacceptable choice. In
the 2002 French presidential election, this system probably would have made Le Pen’s candidacy less viable,
since most French voters apparently ranked him a distant third and cumulative voting would have allowed
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others to swamp the strong Le Pen supporters by splitting their votes across Chirac and Jospin.
Of course the level and sophistication of the strategies depend in part on the number of cumulative votes
that can be cast by each voter. Suppose, in one extreme,
that voters only get two votes to split across multiple
candidates. This essentially reduces the possible strategies to three: (1) both votes on the number one preferred candidate, (2) split across the top two candidates
as a conservative way to fend off the last choice, and
(3) both votes on the second choice because that candidate has the greatest (perceived) potential to beat the
last choice, and the most-preferred choice is still likely
to win without these two votes.
3.5 Condorcet Voting

One system, originally proposed by Condorcet
(1785), seeks to find collective consensus by setting up
a series of pairwise contests among candidates and selecting the winner as the one who beats each of the
others in this round-robin procedure. More formally,
if there are K candidates or proposals, c1 , c2 , . . . , cK ,
then the Condorcet winner, cj , receives the greatest
number of wins in each of the K − 1 round-robin trials:
cj > ci , ∀ i = j , no matter what the order of the trials.
It should be obvious that in the absence of strategic voting, the Condorcet winner would also be the plurality
winner, and no forced electoral agenda in the form of
ordering the trials would alter the result.
Condorcet himself felt that enlightened voters will
honestly attempt to determine what decision best
serves society and that they are more often right than
wrong, thus justifying majority rule in principle. He
demonstrated his argument using the newly developed
calculus of probabilities. While Condorcet concedes
that voters will not always make the best decision, he
argues that because more voters will make the right
decision than the wrong decision, the probability of
selecting the right candidate is considerably higher
than the probability of selecting the wrong candidate.
Condorcet’s system is actually built on what he calls
opinions, which are an early expression of what we
now call utility, except that decisions (and therefore
relative opinions) are restricted to pairwise comparisons. Condorcet voting is based on the following internal calculus:
• All possible opinions that do not imply a contradiction reduce to an indication of the order of merit that
one judges to exist among the candidates. So for K
candidates, an individual faces K(K −1)/2 pairwise
comparisons (propositions).

• Each voter thus gives his or her opinion by indicating
the candidates’ order of personal utility. These
comparisons can be done individually or by groups.
Taking the number of times that each is contained in
the opinion of n voters, one will have the number of
voices for each proposition.
• One forms an opinion from those K(K − 1)/2
propositions that agree with the personal utility. If
this opinion is among the K! possible opinions,
one regards as elected the subject to whom this
opinion accords the preference. If this opinion is
among the 2K(K−1)/2 − K(K − 1) · · · 2 impossible
(contradictory) opinions, then one reverses in that
impossible opinion the set of propositions that have
the least combined plurality and one adopts the
opinion from those that remain (Young, 1988).
One motivation for Condorcet voting is that it reinforces the popularity of the winner, which can assist
in governing. However, it is clearly a higher standard
than simple aggregation by plurality or majority. In addition, this procedure can lead to a cycling problem
called the Condorcet paradox, which we describe in
Section 4.1.
3.6 Borda Count

Although the Borda procedure is not currently used
in any national public elections, it is a well-known
ranking procedure (Felsenthal, Maoz and Rapoport,
1993; Cox, 1997). Borda (1781) proposed that voters
rank order all the K competing candidates, wherein
the candidate ranked first receives from each voter
K − 1 points and the candidate ranked second gets
K − 2 points, and so on, until the last candidate receives no points. The points are then summed over all
n ballots, and the candidate with the most points wins.
There is also the so-called Nanson elimination procedure (Nanson, 1882) which eliminates all candidates
who are below some criterion such as the mean Borda
score and then does a regular Borda count on the survivors.
It has been argued that the Condorcet and Borda
procedures are designed to achieve two different purposes, wherein Condorcet’s procedure is intended to
provide the greatest overall satisfaction to an absolute
majority of the voters and Borda’s procedure is designed to provide the greatest overall satisfaction to
the entire electorate (Dummett, 1984; Felsenthal, Maoz
and Rapoport, 1993). Felsenthal, Maoz and Rapoport
demonstrated this point with the following example:
suppose there are 100 voters and three candidates a, b
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and c, where one winner must be selected, and 66 voters have the ranking [a, b, c] and the remaining 34 voters have the ranking [b, c, a]. In this setup a is the Condorcet winner: a > b by 66 to 34, and a > c by 100
to 0. However, b is the Borda count winner since the
votes would be assigned as follows: a, 66 × 2 = 132;
b, 34 × 2 + 66 × 1 = 134; c, 34 × 1 = 34.
There are several criticisms of the Borda count.
Like the Condorcet procedure, it fails to take into
account the intensity of the rankings since ordinal
preferences are forced into equal-distance integers.
Also, there is great opportunity for strategic voting by
individuals who understand the aggregate preferences
of the electorate (obviously more difficult in large
elections). Returning to the example above, if only 2 of
the 66 voters in the first group exchange their second
and third place preferences strategically, [a, b, c] to
[a, c, b], then a is now the Borda count winner. This
is classic strategic voting: why should these voters care
what their second and third place preferences are listed
as if their preferred candidate wins the election as a
result of their insincere switch?
3.7 Hare Procedure

A vote counting method known as the Hare procedure was introduced by Hare (1859) and popularized with John Stuart Mill’s advocacy. It has become
known as the single-transferable vote system (STV;
Taylor, 1971; Felsenthal, Maoz and Rapoport, 1993).
This process is primarily utilized where it is necessary
to elect more than one candidate, but it can also be
used to select a single winner. Unlike the similar Borda
count, this procedure is employed in several places including Australia, Malta, The Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland. [One observer has hence referred to
STV as the Anglo-Saxon version of proportional representation (Bogdanor, 1984).]
The Hare procedure is a form of proportional representation. The first kind of proportional representation
involves voters selecting a party and then the seats are
apportioned to the parties in accordance with their proportional share of the votes. The executive selected is
generally the leader of the party that received the highest proportion of votes, and the legislative seats are often filled according to a rank order list generated by
each respective party. The Hare procedure of proportional representation is employed and supported by advocates who are not content with this idea of parties
generating rank order lists independently of the voters.
For electing a single candidate, the procedure involves obtaining a complete preference order list or
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ballot from each voter in the form of an assigned
preference from 1 to K for a K-candidate list. If no
candidate obtains a majority of first-place votes, the
last-place candidate is eliminated and this process is
repeated until a candidate has a majority of the firstplace votes (Merrill, 1984). This is referred to as a
transferable-vote procedure because the votes from the
eliminated candidate are essentially transferred to the
other candidates when the process is repeated. [Therefore, first past the post with K > 1 is just a singlenontransferable vote system (SNTV). For example, in
a K = 4 district, a candidate would need one more vote
past 20% to ensure election. SNTV is used in Jordan
and Vanuatu, but is best known from its use in Japan
from 1948 until 1993.] The same process is employed
to select multiple winners, and the iterative process is
completed when the target number of candidates has
been selected.
Since the Hare procedure is typically applied in
multimember constituencies (more than one person per
district is elected), some procedure is required such
that the correct number of candidates is eventually
selected to serve, given the fixed size of the legislative
body. A minimum point threshold, called the droop
quota is calculated to determine a minimum winning
number of votes:
total number of votes
(3.1)
+ 1.
Dq =
total number of seats + 1
Suppose that there is a district with 100 voters, all of
whom participate, and this district needs to elect 3 representatives. The droop quota is then 100/(3 +1)+1 =
26. That is, every candidate who obtains 26 or more
votes is guaranteed a seat in the legislature, and there
cannot be more than 3 who meet such a criteria. If less
than 3 candidates meet this threshold, then the votes
that the winning candidate(s) received are transferred
to the other candidates by the order of the voters’ stipulated second most-preferred candidate. This process
then continues until the required allotment of representatives is obtained.
The second type of proportional representation turns
the standard logic around and instead of calculating
seats based on an apportionment, it determines what
each party pays for their seats in stages. The two
most common forms are the d’Hondt method and the
Sainte-Laguë method. In Cox’s (1997) notation, for
party i, ai (t) is ith average seats at period t, si (t)
is the seats in previous periods and vi is the total
vote. The d’Hondt method allocates seats by a staged
process, where the first-stage seats are allocated by
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dividing the number of valid votes cast vi by the total
number of seats allocated, si (t) + 1, where si (1) = 0
in the first-stage: ai (t) = vi /(si (t) + 1). The party
receiving the highest ratio of votes at time t = 1 is
allocated one seat and their ratio is now vi /2. In the
second stage, the process is repeated with the firststage losers ratio remaining as vi /(si (t) + 1), and again
the party with the highest ratio is allocated one seat,
altering their ratio for the next stage. This process is
repeated, updating ai (t) for each party, until all seats
are filled. The Sainte-Laguë method is similar but alters
the base formula by changing the total number of
seats term, resulting in ai (t) = vi /(2si (t) + 1). These
second types of proportional representation systems
are known to disadvantage smaller parties relative to
the first type because very dominant parties (those with
vi much greater than these small parties) will have
slowly eroding ai (t) values.
3.8 Coombs Procedure

While the Hare method aims at choosing the alternative that is most intensively preferred by the majority
of voters, the Coombs procedure (Coombs, 1964) can
be interpreted as seeking to select the candidate or set
of candidates that is least objectionable by a majority
(Nurmi, 1983). This procedure is similar to the Hare
procedure in its process, but instead of eliminating the
candidate with the least amount of first-rank votes in
each iteration, the candidate with the most last-rank
votes is eliminated. Table 2, which was designed by
Straffin (1980), illustrates the process.
In this example, a would be eliminated because it has
the largest number of last-rank votes (8), but using the
Condorcet winner selection process a would win. This
demonstrates how the choice of a selection process
can substantially influence the results. The Coombs
procedure can also be repeated in the same fashion
as the Hare procedure to reach the targeted number of
winners. However, using the Hare procedure, a selected
winner in a multimember race may have more last-rank
votes than another candidate who would be selected as
winner using the Coombs procedure.

4. IRONIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF
PREFERENCE AGGREGATION

In this section we describe some of the seemingly
odd things that can happen with perfectly reasonable
voting systems when voters attempt to maximize their
individual utilities. The first topic, Condorcet’s paradox, shows that under totally defensible assumptions,
we can find no clear solution. This problem is addressed by Arrow’s theorem, for which Kenneth Arrow won the Nobel Prize, showing that in fact there
is no perfect vote aggregation system and, therefore,
all implemented systems have a logical defect. Some
solutions to this problem are better than others, and
Black’s median voter theorem elegantly demonstrates
that single-peaked individual utility distributions lead
to stable outcomes.
4.1 Condorcet’s Paradox

Consider a small election situation such as a majority vote by a three-person city council. The principle discussed here applies in more general settings
but the restriction to three voters makes the point more
clearly. (The three-person election here is equivalent
to a larger general election with the unrealistic assumption that the electorate could be divided into three
groups of exactly the same size based on their vote
preferences. Work that generalizes this can be significantly more complex.) The city council is faced with
a funding decision for a youth center which has not
yet shown to have a substantial positive effect. Council member A is a pessimist and believes that the program will never work at any funding level. Council
member B believes that the current funding level is the
problem and that the council should vote to increase
the amount or cut the program (in that order). Council member C strongly supports the youth center at its
current funding, but would accept more funding rather
than elimination. These positions are given in Table 3
and Figure 1.
In this setup we apply Condorcet voting by first running the decrease alternative against the status quo

TABLE 2

TABLE 3
Condorcet preferences

Number of voters

Preference
ordering

5

4

2

4

2

4

a
b
c

a
c
b

b
a
c

b
c
a

c
a
b

c
b
a

X = (a, b, c), N = 21

Position of
preference
Most
Next
Least

Council member
A

B

C

Decrease
Status quo
Increase

Increase
Decrease
Status quo

Status quo
Increase
Decrease
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ual i has the following properties:
• ∀ x, y, xPi y or yPi x (Pi is complete).
• ∀ x, y, z, xPi y and yPi z → xPi z (Pi is transitive).
• xIi y and yIi z → xIi z (i.e., Ii is transitive).
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Condorcet preferences.

alternative. Member A prefers decrease, member B
prefers decrease and member C prefers status quo, so
decrease wins the first round. Now pair the decrease
alternative against the increase alternative. Member A
prefers decrease and members B and C prefer increase.
Now increase wins. Finally, pair the status quo alternative against the increase alternative (the only pairwise contest we have not run so far). Member A prefers
status quo, member B prefers increase and member C
prefers status quo. Here status quo wins. Wait, this is
alarming. We get a different winning alternative with
each pairing and any order to Condorcet voting just
sets up an endless cycle of futile comparisons. There
will never be any Condorcet winner with these three
preferences. Interestingly, of the systems described in
Section 3, only Condorcet voting does not guarantee a
winner.
4.2 Arrow’s Theorem

Arrow (1951) showed that the Condorcet paradox
is really a manifestation of a much more important
phenomenon. In fact, he proved that unless one is
willing to violate one of a set of reasonable democratic
norms, the type of cycling seen with the Condorcet
paradox is an inevitability.
The Arrow impossibility theorem directly addresses
voter preference rather than the combination of turnout
and preference. The question addressed is whether
there is a universal mechanism for systematically collecting preferences to reflect an aggregate societal ordering of choice. That is, Arrow is concerned with determining whether the aggregation of voter preferences
actually yields a democratic decision. He builds his
theory around the previously discussed concept of a
strict voter preference and the indifferent voter. It is
assumed that each individual has a preference between
any single pair of alternatives and that the preference
among the alternatives (x, y, z, . . .) for each individ-

These axioms must also be satisfied between the
social conditions of each possible pair. If O denotes
the order of social preferences, then the method of
aggregation can be a function O = f (O1 , O2 , . . . , On )
which specifies for each set of individual preferences
a rank of the alternatives and this is used to create a
social welfare function (Taylor, 1971). A social welfare
function can be defined as a mapping of individual
preference lists (without ties) to an aggregate social
preference list. The relation P of strict preference and
the relation I of indifference can be defined in terms
of O:
(4.1) xPi y ↔ ¬yOi x, xIi y ↔ ¬xOi y and yOi x.
Now that the assumed properties of the individual and
social preferences have been established, the requirements to satisfy the social welfare function are then
expressions of P and I , where the lack of indexing denotes group preference:
1. Unrestricted domain. Actors can hold any possible
preference ordering over the outcomes.
2. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. The social
decision between any two alternatives, x and y,
depends only on the individual orderings of x and y.
3. Pareto principle. If xPi y ∀ i, then xP y.
4. Nondictatorship. There is no single i, such that,
for all x and y, xPi y → xP y, regardless of the
orderings of all individuals other than i.
Arrow’s theorem is aptly named the “impossibility theorem” because there is no social welfare function (aggregation scheme) that can satisfy conditions
1–4 simultaneously. It is logically impossible. Therefore, collective social decisions cannot yield a truly
democratic system in this sense. This is not to imply that some form of oppression always results; high
levels of agreement may mitigate the effects of violating these norms (see Sen, 1984, for an extended
discussion). Many critics have altered this conclusion
by relaxing conditions (Campbell, 1977; Plott, 1967).
Tullock (1967) attempted to show that the cycles in Arrow’s theorem are irrelevant for large groups of voters.
Nonetheless, Arrow’s theorem is remarkable in its simplicity and the surprising power of its conclusion.
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4.3 The Median Voter Theorem

The simplest, most direct analysis of the aggregation
of vote preferences in elections is the median voter
theorem. Black’s (1958) early work identified the
role of a specific voter whose position in a single
issue dimension is at the median of other voters’
preferences. His theorem roughly states that if all
of the voters’ utility functions are unimodal on a
single issue dimension, then the median voter will
always be in the winning majority. Thus Black uses
the individual unimodal assumption to escape the
specter of Arrow’s theorem and subsequent cycling.
The unimodal assumption dispenses with Arrow’s
unrestricted domain requirement by mandating that
each voter in the model have a single expressed
preference.
The median voter theorem is displayed in Figure 2, which is a reproduction of Black’s figure (1958,
page 15). Shown are the tops of the utility functions for
five hypothetical voters on an interval measured issue
space (the x axis). It is assumed, but by convention not
drawn, that the individual utility functions have support over the complete issue space with asymptotic tail
behavior. In the case given here it is clear that the voter
with the mode at O3 , his or her ideal point, is the median voter in this system.
The median voter theorem requires two primary
restrictions. There must be a single issue dimension
(unless the same person is the median voter in all
relevant dimensions) and each voter must have a
unimodal utility function. Also, for simplicity, the size
of the voting population is often assumed to be odd.
In the case of an even number (which is possible
and important in the case of committee analysis), the
winning position is the mean of the two modes that
jointly comprise a median. We assume below that the
voting population is odd to simplify the terminology.
[The even versus odd distinction is actually much less
important than it would seem. If we were to eliminate
one of the voters in Figure 2, then in fact there would
be two medians (presuming of course that we cannot
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cut voters in half or something). Black’s theorem still
works since there is no winning coalition without the
approval of both of the median voters and, therefore,
the median voter wins again, even though the definition
of median voter now counts as two people. In such
situations where ties are possible, which of course
is much more likely with small voting bodies, it is
typical to see detailed contingencies worked out in
advance. Small wonder why there are nine Supreme
Court justices in the United States.] There are also two
other assumptions we glossed over above: all voters
participate in the election and all voters express their
true preferences (sincere voting). There is a substantial
literature that evaluates the median voter theorem after
altering these assumptions (see Dion, 1992, e.g.).
In Black’s original notation, the median voter theorem is stated as follows:
T HEOREM 2. When there are n members in a
committee, all of whose curves are single peaked, and
n is odd, the value O(n+1)/2 can get at least a simple
majority against every other and it is the only value
which can do so.
P ROOF. Suppose the median position, O(n+1)/2 , is
placed against a lower value, O < O(n+1)/2 , in a vote.
Because 12 (n + 1) of the voters have modes above
O(n+1)/2 by definition, 12 (n + 1) or more curves are
up sloping to the right at O . Therefore, the median
position will get a number of votes in the interval
[ 12 (n + 1) : n], which is always a majority. A vote above
O(n+1)/2 loses as well by the symmetric argument. 
Similar proofs were given by Enelow and Hinich
(1984) and Mueller (1989). The core of this proof is
the use of “up sloping” as an indicator of increasing
utility received for one position over another for a
specific individual. This is where the key assumption
of unimodality is required.
It is also clear that along the interval-measured
policy space shown in Figure 2, the winning proposal
does not have to be exactly at the median voter’s utilitymaximizing point. Suppose that a proposal is offered to
the voters that is just slightly off of the mode of O3 ’s
utility curve (O3 + δ). Clearly for small δ this proposal
would also win. So more generally we can define a
winset as the set of winning proposals over all other
alternatives. That is, for every point along the x axis
it is possible to determine if this point wins on single
vote if we know enough about the shape of each voter’s
utility distribution.
There is another interesting implication from Black’s
model. In basic settings, such as the one described
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here, two candidates or parties are motivated to move
toward the median voter from either end of the policy
spectrum. This result is often used as an explanation for
the similarity of the two dominant American political
parties (at least in comparison with other industrialized
democracies). While there are obvious exceptions and
complications such as third party entries, non-singlemember/single-district systems and multidimensional
issues, this spatial convergence is a surprisingly robust
phenomenon (Calvert, 1985; Enelow and Hinich, 1984,
1990; Shepsle, 1991).
5. SPATIAL MODELS OF VOTING

Black’s median voter theorem is actually a simple
case of what are now called spatial voting models.
The general principle is that issue preference can be
measured in Euclidean space: k-dimensional interval
scales. So the further a given candidate or proposal is in
issue dimension from a given voter’s ideal position, the
less utility that voter receives from voting positively.
This is quite intuitive; if I am a member of Congress
strongly supportive of the NRA’s interpretation of the
second amendment on gun ownership, then the more
a bill restricts gun purchases, the less satisfaction I
receive from its passage and therefore the less likely
I am to vote in favor of it.
The study of spatial models started with Hotelling
(1929), who showed why firms tend to cluster together
geographically even though they are competitors (the
classic modern example is the configuration of auto
dealers). The field was initially slow to develop (important works were few: Smithies, 1941; Black, 1948,
1958; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Downs, 1957; Davis and
Hinich, 1966; Plott, 1967), but is now quite active as
a research area. Riker and Ordeshook (1968), as well
as Davis and Hinich (1967) and Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), provided the classic works on the underlying assumptions, and most work builds on these
general ideas. In principle, there are two objectives in
this literature: to find an equilibrium point derived from
initial conditions that predict voter or candidate behavior and to explain empirically observed behavior from
basic motivations. In both cases the fundamental ideas
all revolve around the principle of issue space and issue
distance as a negative utility factor.
Where spatial models get more interesting and more
complicated is in the multidimensional case (more than
one issue space). In fact, Hinich (1977) showed that the
median voter is irrelevant in highly multidimensional
settings because the probability that a single individual
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occupies the median position on every dimension is
ridiculously small in such applications.
Consider a zero-sum voting game to divide money
between two competing programs. In textbook economic parlance this is guns versus butter; slightly more
realistically, Tullock (1967) compared appropriations
for the Navy versus the Army. This is now a twodimensional voting problem because for every point
on the two-dimensional x–y grid of spending, there is
a utility level for each given voter. More realistically,
evaluate public policy spending in terms of alternative energy sources. Imagine that a new administration
needs to send Congress a budget for research and development spending that divides total possible spending between coal and petroleum.
A hypothetical member of Congress is assumed to
have an ideal spending level for each project that trades
off spending in one dimension against another, where
the highest altitude ideal point, and therefore mode
of the preference structure, is located at [petroleum =
0.65, coal = 0.35] on a standardized metric (dollars
removed).
The first two panels of Figure 3 show the example
representative’s utility preference: a three-dimensional
wire-frame drawing that reveals the dimensionality
now present over the petroleum/coal grid and a contour
plot which illustrates three specified levels of utility
(U1 , U2 , U3 ). The contour plot is actually a more useful
heuristic because it allows us to see utility as part of
the issue space. As indicated by the dashed lines, there
is a modal point for our voter and utility decreases
circularly (an assumption) as the potential spending
tradeoff moves in any direction from this point. That
is, this voter has a lower returned utility for a spending
level at [0.2, 0.8] than at [0.6, 0.4]. Therefore, any
point outside a given contour provides less utility than
all the points inside this contour, no matter what the
direction from the ideal point. Now unlike the simple
one-dimensional case, the voter can be more or less
satisfied by movement in two dimensions.
The third panel in Figure 3 generalizes the preference structure by showing a noncircular structure that
indicates that the member has more sharply declining
utility in the coal direction than in the petroleum direction. This means that he or she will be less amenable
to compromise or negotiation in that direction. This is
an important distinction because it is often unrealistic
to assume that voters have the same declining rate of
utility across multiple dimensions.
Inasmuch as the single dimension assumption was a
simplification, two dimensions also might not reflect
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political reality. The setup described can be generalized (although not always easily visualized) to higher
dimensions wherein preference radiates outward in the
downward direction from ideal points as spheres (three
issues) or hyperspheres (four or more issues).
So far the spatial analysis has only shown one
voter, which clearly is not very realistic. Now consider
the utility preferences of three voters over the same
issue space. Furthermore, instead of a detailed contour
description of the utility structure for these three
voters, we will consider only the contour level that
immediately provokes an affirmative vote by that
person. (We could also use a more rigid definition
of approval here that says that the single contour
represents a final, unyielding vote threshold. That is,
the voter will always vote yes for proposals inside the
threshold and always vote no for proposals outside
the threshold.) For some this will be a tight contour,
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indicating reluctance to deviate far from the ideal
point; for others, it will be wider, indicating reasonable
flexibility on an initial vote.
Figure 4 shows a hypothetical set of three voters with
their immediate affirmative vote frontier given by a
contour for each, with the ideal points marked in the
middle. In the first panel there is an intersecting region
between the contours of voter 1 and voter 2, meaning
that a proposed spending level between the two policy
alternatives that falls in this area will immediately get
these two votes and therefore pass (a winset) even
though the third voter’s region does not also intersect
(two voters constitute a majority here). The second
panel shows a slightly more complicated situation.
There are now three overlaps of interest that are all
winsets. There remains the winset between voter 1
and voter 2, but there is also a winset between voter 2
and voter 3 that excludes voter 1, and a winset between
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voter 1 and voter 3 that excludes voter 2. Note also that
there is also a small winset produced by a unanimous
vote.
The arrangement of ideal points is important. In
Figure 4 they are spread out through the issue space
without any special features. Interestingly, if the ideal
points are perfectly linear in any direction, then this
two-dimensional issue space is reduced to a onedimensional (composite) issue space and Black’s median voter theorem prevails. Plott (1967) showed that
in general if there is “radial symmetry” around some
point, meaning that the ideal points are distributed
symmetrically and linearly in any given radial direction, then this center point functions like Black’s median voter position, even in high dimensions. Unfortunately, this idea of radial symmetry is completely
artificial and unrealistic, and McKelvey (1976) soon
thereafter showed with his “chaos theorem” that no
naturally occurring single-point winset will emerge.
His theorem is named as such because in higher dimensions the voting is almost guaranteed to return
to Arrow’s configuration with no Condorcet winner
and endless cycling (hence legislative chaos). This is
where agenda setting matters. Consider again the second panel of Figure 4, except now stipulate that voter 2
has agenda control: he or she can decide which alternatives are put up for a vote. As long as he or she does
not allow a vote on a proposition in the intersection
between voter 1 and voter 3 that excludes his or her intersection, he or she will either get no bill passed or get
a bill within his or her acceptance frontier.
While it is true that in a multidimensional spatial
model under majority rule there will almost certainly
not be a single majority winner, it is clear from seeing
elections and legislative action that there is a great
deal of stability nonetheless (Fiorina and Plott, 1978;
Tullock, 1981). This motivates a large literature that
seeks to explain observed stability, the central focus
of which is to specify regions of the multidimensional
issue space that dominate others and therefore lead
to equilibrium outcomes. Some of these are quite
fundamental notions. The core is the set of points
that beats all others under majority rule and is the
“median of the induced ideal points on all lines
containing it” (Cox, 1987). Related to the core, but
weaker, is the Copeland winner, which is the point
that is majority preferred to the largest proportion of
all other alternative points (Grofman, Owen, Noviello
and Glazer, 1987).
Sometimes the core does not even exist and so a
generalization is needed. A point in the issue space,
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a, covers another, b, if the majority prefers a to b,
and every other alternative, c, that the majority prefers
over a is also preferred over b: aCb (McKelvey, 1986).
An uncovered set, A , within a larger set (possibly
all sets), A , contains all points with the condition
that there is no point b in A such that bCa (Miller,
1980). The uncovered set is equal to the core when
the core exists and voters have spherical preferences
(panel 2 of Figure 3, but not panel 3). It is also possible
to define the yolk as the smallest sphere (circle for
two dimensions) that intersects all median hyperplanes
(lines for two dimensions; Ferejohn, McKelvey and
Packel, 1984). A median line generalizes Black’s
theorem by cutting the plane such that half of the voter
ideal points are on either side. The larger the yolk,
the further the system is away from having a single
core element (Grofman, 1989). There are many more
related criteria with varying assumptions, but all are
directed toward describing equilibrium regions of the
multidimensional issue space distinct from the elusive
single majority winner.
6. PROBABILISTIC VOTING MODELS

Probabilistic voting adds a new element of uncertainty to the voting process in which there is a random element to any voter’s utility calculation that is
expressly modeled with the mechanics of probability theory. Probabilistic voting models retain the spatial model description of preference, but replace the
discrete and deterministic utility-maximizing decision
with a continuously measured probabilistic calculation
that sometimes produces a vote for alternatives with
lower expected utility.
The motivation for assuming this probabilistic element in voting is to account for either inadvertent or
deliberate uncertainty in the expected return for voting for a specific candidate or proposal. That is, candidates may have an incentive to be vague on certain issues (Franklin, 1991; Shepsle, 1972), issues may
be complex or poorly posed, information may be limited and voters themselves may simply have a difficult
time mapping alternatives to expected utility. In support of this point, Fiorina (1981) asserted that “In the
real world choices are seldom so clean as those suggested by formal decision theory. Thus real decision
makers are best analyzed in probabilistic terms rather
than deterministic terms.”
The idea that voting models should have a probabilistic component was primarily developed by a relatively small cohort of authors. (Key works include
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Hinich, 1977; Hinich and Munger, 1994; Coughlin,
1982, 1992; Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981; Enelow, Endersby and Munger, 1993; Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook, 1972, 1973; Mueller, 1989; Enelow and
Hinich, 1984; Ordeshook, 1986.) Burden (1997) provided an excellent overview of the differences between deterministic models and probabilistic models,
and demonstrated empirically that the alternative assumptions can lead to differing conclusions with the
same data. (See also Calvert, 1986, and Mueller, 1989,
for contrasts between deterministic and probabilistic
assumptions.)
Consider a two-candidate plurality election between
c1 and c2 , where voters can abstain due to alienation
(the utility of the preferred candidate is below a minimum threshold) or indifference (the utility difference
between the preferred candidate and the other is below a minimum threshold). Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook (1973) developed a model to account probabilistically for abstention by voter i from these two
sources starting with the probability of voting for each
candidate expressed proportionally with the respective
utilities pi (c1 ) = ai [U (c1 )] and pi (c2 ) = ai [U (c2 )],
where ai is an individually determined constant. Here
each candidate is evaluated separately and we assume
that when U (ci ) < Umin (ci ) for the preferred candidate (preference based on greater utility), the voter abstains due to alienation. The probability of voting for
the preferred candidate j over the other candidate k
is pi (cj ) = bi [U (cj ) − U (ck )], where bi is a different individually determined constant. Here voter i now
abstains if [U (cj ) − U (ck )] < mini [U (cj ) − U (ck )],
because the utility difference falls below an indifferent threshold. We can put these two calculations together by positing an importance weight such that εi
is the importance of alienation to voter i, and 1 − εi
is the complementary importance of indifference to
voter i. Thus voter i votes for his or her preferred
candidate j over k, versus abstaining, with probability
pi (cj ) = (εi )ai [U (cj )] + (1 − εi )bi [U (cj ) − U (ck )].
Now we have a probabilistic model that accounts for
candidate utility preference, individualistic thresholds
and weights on alienation and indifference, as well as
a useful method for aggregating these effects across
an electorate. Ironically, it has been demonstrated that
this type of probabilistic model leads to a great degree
of certainty in candidate strategy: there are identifiable
strategies that produce higher probabilities of electoral
success (Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981; Denzau and Kats,
1977).

7. COST–BENEFIT MODELS OF VOTING

One area of study focuses on the individual’s decision to participate in a given election. Essentially the
question condenses to, Why does anyone vote? Clearly
individuals experience personal costs in the process of
voting: time, transportation and inconvenience (without any real hope of personally affecting the election).
So one would therefore surmise that there must be
countervailing benefits. It seems very simple at first.
7.1 The Downsian Model

The modern study of voter turnout starts in 1957
with Anthony Downs, who calculated that voting is
typically an irrational act. Downs (1957) argued that
a rational, utility-maximizing voter would weigh the
cost of voting against the expected utility of a preferred
candidate winning times the likelihood that the vote
will make a difference in the election. The expected
utility of the preferred candidate winning may differ
dramatically depending on the voter’s attitude toward
the opposing candidate and the expected benefits from
the preferred candidate’s programs. However, since
the likelihood of any one person’s vote being the
critical decider of an election, especially a national
one, is infinitesimally small (see Gelman, King and
Boscardin, 1998), the rational voter will abstain so as
to not incur the costs. Unfortunately for the theory,
approximately half of the eligible U.S. voters show up
at the polls and are, therefore, Downsian irrationals.
This henceforth has been referred to as the paradox of
not voting in the voting literature. Downs wrestled with
the paradox that some people do vote and concluded
that there must be a significant benefit to the voter:
the long run participation value of supporting the
democratic system.
7.2 The Free-Rider Problem

Olson (1965) damaged Downs’ last argument by
pointing out that in large collective action problems,
like elections, there is an incentive for people to
simply let others decide since the probability that their
own vote is a determinant is near zero and the cost
of voting is likely to supersede the Downsian social
or psychological benefit of voting. He called these
nonparticipating utility maximizers free-riders because
they ride on the system, collecting the same benefits (or
costs) as every other citizen, but they do not contribute
by participating in the decision.
Olson’s observation leads to two questions. First,
will the expected noneconomic (direct) benefits ever
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exceed the costs for voters? Second, can incentive systems be designed such that the free-rider problem is
eliminated or reduced? The answer to the first question
is an obvious “yes,” since people actually do show up
and vote in large elections. The answer to the second
question is actually “sometimes,” and where we see
direct evidence of this effect is in the behavior of interest groups. Interest groups (pressure groups, lobbying groups, special interests, etc.) confront an extreme
example of the free-rider problem because it is commonly perceived by individuals that these groups will
continue to pursue their public policy interests regardless of a single individual’s membership or not. Suppose that a citizen believes strongly in protecting the
natural environment. It is also unlikely that this person
feels that their individual annual membership cost of
$25 (in 2002) will alter the effectiveness of the Sierra
Club as a national advocate for natural protection, and
therefore there is an incentive to be a free rider rather
than a dues-paying member. Interests groups subsequently circumvent this problem by offering particularistic benefits to members only, in addition to their
public advocacy work. For instance, the Sierra Club
currently offers (in 2002) new members “a free Sierra
Club Expedition Pack (limited time only), one-year
subscription to Sierra magazine, members-only ecotravel opportunities, automatic membership in your local chapter and discounts on Sierra Club calendars,
books and other merchandise.”
7.3 Formalization of the Cost–Benefits Model

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) codified the standard
Downs model into mathematical symbology:
R = the satisfaction in utiles of voting,
P = the probability that the voter will affect the
outcome with his or her particular vote,
B = the difference in benefits between the two
candidates measured in utiles, B1 − B2,
C = the cost of voting in utiles (i.e., time, effort,
money).
Thus the Downsian model is represented as R = P B −
C, where the voter will abstain if R < 0. Also note
that if R > 0, the voter still may not vote because
there may be other competing activities that produce
a higher R for that given point in time. Assuming that
C > 0, then P B must be greater than C for the voter
to vote, and since we know that P is very small (he
or she is very unlikely to be the pivotal voter), then
B must be very large for a vote to occur. Obviously
it would take an unrealistically large value for B to

overcome this small value of P . Riker and Ordeshook
addressed this problem by formalizing the additional
Downsian satisfaction parameter for each voter, D.
This D is added to the right-hand side of the equation
and represents the personal satisfaction/utility that a
citizen receives from the act of voting regardless of
the actual outcome of the election, thus producing a
new Downsian model: R = P B − C + D. Therefore,
some people will vote and some will not, depending on
whether Di sufficiently overcomes Ci for individual i.
The parameter D is said to consist of various social and
psychological subfactors such as citizen duty, prestige,
guilt relief and a sense of continuing the political
system (although this term strikes some as a rather ad
hoc repair to the model).
To include uncertainty about the election outcome,
begin with a hypothetical citizen facing a two-candidate race where candidate K1 is preferred to candidate K2 . There are five mutually exclusive and exhaustive election states based on the number of votes for
the first candidate, n1 , and the number of votes for the
second candidate, n2 , not including our hypothetical
voter’s participation. These are listed in Table 4.
Using the simple Downsian model we can construct
a payoff matrix that cross-tabulates the utility to the
citizen for each voting action, voting for candidate 1,
voting for candidate 2 and abstaining (V1 , V2 , Abs),
by the five possible election outcomes. Essentially this
internalizes and elaborates the P term across each of
the possibilities in Table 4. Here the citizen’s utility for
K1 winning is B, K2 winning is 0 and, in the event
of a tie, there will be a coin flip, thus giving utility
1
1
1
2 U (K1 ) + 2 U (K2 ) = 2 B. This structure is elaborated
in Table 5.
The citizen is assumed to be a Downsian rational calculator of the value of voting given the cost of voting, C. In the standard setup, this person will make
a priori subjective calculations about the probability
of the Si events, and these probabilities are labelled
pi , i = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, corresponding to each Si , where
TABLE 4
The five possible election states
State
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5

Formula
n1 > n2 + 1
n1 = n2 + 1
n1 = n2
n1 = n2 − 1
n1 < n2 − 1

Description
K1
K1
K1
K1
K1

wins by more than one vote
wins by only one vote
and K2 tie
loses by only one vote
loses by more than one vote
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TABLE 5
Payoff matrix for the Downsian voter

V1
V2
Abs

S1

S2

S3

S4

B −C +D
B −C +D
B

B −C +D
1B − C + D
2

B −C+D
−C + D
1B
2

1B − C + D
2

B



pi = 1. Since there are now defined outcome utilities and associated event probabilities, we can calculate the expected value of each voting alternative to this
citizen:
E[U (V1 )] = p1 (B − C + D) + p2 (B − C + D)


+ p3 (B − C + D) + p4 12 B − C + D



+ (1 − p1 − p2 − p3 − p4 )(−C + D)




= B p1 + p2 + p3 + 12 p4 − C + D,
E[U (V2 )] = p1 (B − C + D) + p2

1

2B

−C+D



+ p3 (−C + D) + p4 (−C + D)

(7.1)

+ (1 − p1 − p2 − p3 − p4 )(−C + D)




= B p1 + 12 p2 − C + D,




E[U (Abs)] = p1 (B) + p2 (B) + p3 12 B + p4 (0)
+ (1 − p1 − p2 − p3 − p4 )(0)




= B p1 + p2 + 12 p3 .
We can see immediately that the second option
(V2 ) is fully dominated by the first option (V1 ) since
the terms inside the B parentheses will always be
greater in the former case. Therefore, the real decision
is whether to vote for the preferred candidate or to
abstain. This, of course, makes intuitive sense since any
model that provided for a rational individual voting for
the least-preferred candidate would not be internally
consistent (in the absense of strategic voting). The
individual will vote here if the expected utility of
voting exceeds the expected utility of abstaining. This
is given by E[U (V1 )] > E[U (Abs)], and substituting
in the definitions




B p1 + p2 + p3 + 12 p4 − C + D


> B p1 + p2 + 12 p3



and then simplifying gives
(7.2)

1
2 Bp3

+ 12 Bp4 − C + D > 0.

This looks quite reasonable until we remember that
p3 is the subjective probability of a tie and p4 is

−C + D
0

S5
−C + D
−C + D
0

the subjective probability of a one-vote margin for
K2 (before the citizen of interest votes). What this
means is that, except for very small elections, −C + D
dominates, and voting in elections is therefore not
about affecting the elections, but instead about costs
and personal satisfaction.
8. THE OUTCOME OF THE 2002 U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION UNDER
DIFFERING SYSTEMS

The outcome of the 2000 presidential election centered on events in Florida, including ballot confusion,
allegations of voter fraud, apparent racial bias and of
course the subsequent attempt at a recount along with
its ordered cessation by the U.S. Supreme Court. Suppose that we could replay the vote in Florida between
the four main candidates, George Bush, Al Gore, Ralph
Nader and Pat Buchanan, under different voting systems as described in this review. Would the final result
be different if voters were allowed to express their preferences through alternative mechanisms?
Bush (apparently but not certainly) won the plurality election over Gore by 537 votes out of approximately 5.82M cast in Florida. The closest alternative
to the plurality system is the majority system, but none
of the candidates met the 50% plus one vote standard: Bush received 49.84% (2,912,790 votes), Gore
received 49.83% (2,912,253 votes), Nader received
0.28% (16,415 votes) and Buchanan received 0.04%
(2,281 votes).
If we hypothetically mandated a runoff, then Bush
would have faced Gore in Florida in the second part
of the contest. Given that the same set of voters
participated in the runoff (actually not a very realistic
assumption, recall the French example in Section 1),
and voters expressed sincere preferences, then it is
likely that Gore would have beaten Bush since Nader
voters are closer to Gore voters and Buchanan voters
are closer to Bush voters in multidimensional issue
space. In fact, Gore would only have needed 17% of
the Nader voters to surpass the combined total for Bush
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TABLE 6
Hypothetical approval votes
Approval for

Buchanan

Bush

Gore

Nader

Semi-independents
Supporters
Nader supporters
Remaining Bush
Remaining Gore

0
2,281
0
262,151
0

582,504
2,281
0
2,621,511
0

582,504
0
16,415
0
2,621,028

0
0
16,415
0
262,103

Total

264,432

3,206,296

3,219,947

278,518

and Buchanan (assuming that the remaining Nader
voters did not turn out and vote for Bush).
Is there a Condorcet winner here? The existence of
a Condorcet winner is conditional on the behavior of
the Nader and Buchanan voters. Given spatial issue
preference, full turnout and sincerity among voters,
Gore would presumably pick up more Nader voters
than Bush would Buchanan voters and so would be the
Condorcet winner.
To evaluate the hypothetical results under an approval voting system we make the reasonably realistic assumptions that 10% of Gore and Bush voters are
basically independent and also somewhat ambivalent
between the two, all Buchanan voters approve of Bush
as well, all Nader voters approve of Gore and 10% of
the 90% nonambivalent Bush and Gore voters also approve of Buchanan and Nader, respectively. Applying
these assumptions to the observed vote totals and calculating the approval totals in this order produces the
totals shown in Table 6, where Gore wins.
This is interesting because our assumptions are just
mild reinterpretations of two common admonitions
heard during the campaign: “a vote for Nader is a
vote for Bush because these are votes being taken
away from Gore, not Bush,” which was heard from
many Gore supporters, and “there’s not a dime’s bit of
difference between Gore and Bush,” which was heard
from many Nader supporters.

It is obviously very difficult to conjecture about
the potential results had a cumulative voting system
been implemented because it would be necessary to
fully understand the relative utility produced by each
candidate for each voter. It is likely that Buchanan
supporters generally felt more positive about Bush
than Nader voters did about Gore, but the distribution
of their votes is hard to predict. Furthermore, the
ambivalent group identified above is also difficult
to predict. Nonetheless, the results from cumulative
voting are likely to be similar to the hypothetical
approval results in Table 6, with the important caveat
that the closeness of Bush and Gore makes things less
predictable.
It is somewhat easier to consider what might have
occurred under a Borda count system. Suppose that
every observed vote was relisted such that the
K − 1 = 3 ordered choices were given by the closest
in issue space with a preference away from the middle. This would give the results in Table 7, where again
Gore wins.
Of course this analysis assumes sincere voting and
this is highly unlikely to occur in great measure here:
Bush and Gore voters would certainly be tempted to list
Nader and Buchanan (respectively) higher than their
preferred candidate’s closest competitor as perhaps
third on their list, even though this choice is further
in issue distance than their sincere third pick.

TABLE 7
Hypothetical cumulative votes
Counts for
Buchanan voters
Bush voters
Gore voters
Nader voters
Total

Buchanan

Bush

Gore

Nader

2,281 × 3
2,912,790 × 2
0
0

2,281 × 2
2,912,790 × 3
2,912,253 × 1
16,415 × 1

2,281 × 1
2,912,790 × 1
2,912,253 × 3
16,415 × 2

0
0
2,912,253 × 2
16,415 × 3

5,832,423

11,671,600

11,684,660

5,873,751
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Other voting systems discussed do not really lend
themselves to this type of analysis because they are
more focused on fashioning legislative representation
rather than selecting an executive. Various aggregation methods such as the Hare and Coombs procedures require some form of proportional representation
and apply to parliamentary government. If we could
develop some hypothetical parliamentary outcome for
this election, it would most likely favor Bush, since the
congressional delegation from Florida has quite a few
more Republicans than Democrats.
Although we have had to make a reasonable number
of assumptions in analyzing the 2000 Florida presidential vote, it is clear that the outcome could have differed
under alternative voting and aggregation schemes. This
is a somewhat unusual case study because the vote was
so close and because the Florida outcome became the
deciding factor in the national presidential race. However, it still makes our point that the system in which
votes are counted matters in determining elections. The
intention of this review essay has been to introduce
these particular theories and systems of voting as well
as to demonstrate their current relevance.
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